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THE CONCEPT OF THE FREE SOCIETY 
The aim of the present paper is to present a logical analysis of the con-
cept of the free society. The symbolism used will be that of the Principia 
Mathematica—a few extra-logical symbols being explained when intro-
duced. Regarding logical symbolism, it must be stressed, that the use of ar-
tificial symbols is not to be understood as a formalization. For formaliza-
tion is a procedure by which one abstracts from the meaning of terms and 
operates on the shapes of the (material) symbols alone—which will not be 
done here. The symbolism is rather used as a useful shorthand, without 
which it would be difficult to obtain statements of the desired precision. 
/. Individual freedom 
A definition of social freedom, i.e., of a free society, presupposes the 
concept of the politically free individual. Now an individual is politically 
free in a given field, iff it is not subject to any deontic authority1 in that 
field. Writing "F(x,j)" for "x is free in j " and "A(y,x,j)" for "y is a deon-
tic authority to x in j " we can put: 
(1) F(x,j) m ~(3y)A(y,x,j). 
The use of a quantifier in (1) shows why it is not necessary to conceive 
individual political freedom as a ternary relation, as it has sometimes been 
suggested. It would seem indeed, at first, that freedom is a ternary relation: 
an individual is, namely, not only free to do something, but also free from 
obedience to somebody. But as the variable to be substituted by the name of 
the bearer of authority is bound in (1), it can be omitted in our definien-
dum. 
There are two kinds of deontic authority, namely, the authority of 
sanction and authority of solidarity. In the first case, the aim of the subject 
is different from that of the bearer of authority and he obeys the latter only 
in order to avoid punishment. In the latter, the aim of both the subject and 
the bearer of authority are identical, the former resigning freely his right to 
make decisions in the given field. 
Individual political freedom can be defined, so it seems, by absence of 
any authority in the field, i.e., also form authority of solidarity. But social 
freedom cannot be defined in that way. For even a radically anarchic society 
is one in which there are some freely accepted (solidarity-) authorities. It 
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follows that "A" in the above definition (1) can be read as meaning 
"authority of sanction". It also follows, that the definition of social 
freedom by absence of compulsion is basically correct, contrary to that of 
individual political freedom. 
2. Generalizations 
Using our formula (1) it is possible to define the concepts of a number 
of different societies. It may even be said that (1) is astonishingly fruitful in 
that respect. This is due to the fact that (1) admits a number of different 
quantifications, i.e, generalizations. By listing them, we obtain a logical 
frame for a classification of different societies in regard to freedom. 
Such a classification can only be made with the use of contemporary 
mathematical (Fregean) formal logic, which alone (contrary to the so called 
"conventional" logic) offers a theory of multiple quantification. Such 
quantification is needed here, because we have to operate on a matrix with 
two variables. 
Among the extra-logical symbols "M" for "member" will often be 
used—"M(x,y)" being read: "* is a member (citizen) of the (society) y". 
Concerning the membership of a society, it may be remembered that while 
there always exists a class corresponding to a given society—namely the 
class of its members—the society is not that class. For while a society is a 
real object—it will be enough to recall how real its action is on us—a class is 
never a real thing. In the world there are no classes at all. E.g., it is true that 
there are cows in the real world, but nothing like the class of cows. It may be 
also noted marginally, that our "M" will be considered as a logical 
predicate in Lesniewski's mereology. 
We shall proceed now to list the different a priori possible generaliza-
tions of (1). There are, first of all, two generalizations of one of the 
variables, either "x" or " j " . If the first is bound by a general quantifier we 
obtain something which may be called "field-freedom": 
(2) GFfgJ). m.(x)-M(xj) DFfxJ). 
A society is field-free in j iff all its members are (individually, politically, 
compulsion-free. Thus Switzerland is a field-free country in respect of 
freedom to marry, if all Switzermen are (politically, compulsion-) free to 
marry. 
A similar generalization can be given for the field—this seems, 
however, to have little interest and will not be formulated here. On the con-
trary generalizations of both the subject and the field do offer considerable 
interest and may be listed below. 
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We have here, to begin with, four different quantifications: (I) (x,j), 
(II) (x)(3j), (III) (3x)(j), (IV) (3x,j). But as in (II) and (III) the order of the 
quantifiers is relevant C'(x)(3j)p" does follow from "3j)(x)p" but not in-
versely, we obtain two more relevantly different quantifications: "3j)(x)" 
and "(3j)(x)" and "(j)(3x)"—'\.e., six altogether. Considering that each of 
them can be followed by a negation, we have finally twelve a priori possible 
generalizations. 
3. The twelve types of societies 
Each of these generalizations describes the structure of one of the a 
priori possible simple types of societies in regard of freedom. They are 
represented in the following diagram, in which "x" ranges over the 
members of the given society only, and the matrix "F(x,j)" has been omit-
ted for brevity. 
(x,j)~12. 
(3x,j)~7. 
Here are a few comments on the 6 societies represented by the formulas 
on the left side of the scheme: 
1. Every member of the society is free in all fields—i.e., there is no 
authority of sanction at all. This is probably the definition of a radically 
anarchic society. 
2. There is at least one field in which all members of the society are 
free. If the so called mental activities, like thinking, wishing, etc. are taken 
into consideration, this applies to every possible society—for even in an ex-
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tremely tyranical society the members are free to perform such mental 
actions. But if exterior activites alone are meant, then the formula excludes 
only a slave-owning and, a fortiori, a totalitarian society. 
3. For each member of the society there exists at least one field, in-
which it is free. This is a weaker statement than the preceding and is im-
plied by it. 
4. There is at least one member of the society which is free in all fields. 
This formula applies to a society with dictatorial ruler(s) who can do 
whatever they wish—but is not a definition of it. 
5. In each field there is at least one member of the society which is free 
in it. This follows from statement 4, and is weaker than it. 
6. There is at least one individual and one field in which it is free. This 
is, so-to-say, a minimum of freedom. The statement is implied by all 
statements above it in the diagram (1-5). 
The societies represented by the formulas at the right side of the 
diagram will not be commented on. Each of them is the negation of one of 
those on the left side. The following scheme represents these contradictions: 
12. 
1- (x,j)~ 
(x,j) 
4. 
(3x)G) 
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4. The free society 
Historically-known societies possess only exceptionally simple struc-
tures, which can be represented by one of the above formulas. In most cases 
we have to deal with logical products of such formulas. This is also the case 
of the free society, which is our present concern. An attempt will be made to 
analyse its structure in four successive steps. 
Frist step. One could think at first, that such a society can be defined 
by our formula number 3. We would say then: a society is free if there is at 
least one field of external actions in which all its members are free. Writing 
"FS" for "is a free society" we have then: 
(3) FS(y)- D-(Ej)(x).M(x,y)DF(x,j). 
(3) does formulate, indeed, a necessary condition of a free society; but 
it is surely not a sufficient condition of it. For (3) is satisfied also by an 
anarchic society, in which all members are free in all fields and, consequent-
ly, there is at least one field in which they are free. In order to approximate 
a correct definition of a free society we must, therefore, bring in com-
plements to (3). This is being done in the second step. 
Second step. It is postulated, that all members of the society are not on-
ly free in some field, but also not free in some (other) field. (The formula 
thus obtained is a logical product of our Nr.3 and Nr.10): 
(4) FSfy):D:f3j)(x)-M(x,y)DFfxJ)-(Ej)fx)-M(x,y) D~F(x,j). 
This is again clearly a necessary condition of a free society in as far as it 
is distinguished from the anarchic society. One interesting consequence of 
(4) is, that whoever rejects free society is bound, (according to the so-called 
De Morgan law) to assert either ("in each field there is at least one not free 
member of society") or our (3) ("in each field there is at least one free 
member of the society"). This shows that the often-made inference, that 
whoever rejects the free society is logically bound to accept totalitarianism, 
is incorrect: he has the choice between two sorts of societies, none of which 
can be described as totalitarian. 
But even our corrected formula (4) is not satisfactory as a definition of 
a free society. For it is not enough that every member of it be free in any 
field whatsoever in order that it might be called "free". E.g., it is not 
enough that every member of a society is free to drink a glass of tomato-
juice at breakfast, in order that that society be called "free," if at the same 
time he is deprived of freedom of choice of occupation, of choice of place 
of residence, etc. It appears, consequently, that some further complement is 
necessary. 
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Third step. This complement, it is suggested, will consist in the state-
ment that all members of the free society must be free in all fields which are 
considered as being very important—-let us call them "essential." We shall 
say then, that a free society is on in which all members are free in all such 
fields and there is at least one (other) field in which none of them is free. 
Denoting by "e" the class of essential fields, we shall have then: 
(5) FS(y):D.(x,j):M(x,y)JEe-DF(x,j).(3j)(x)M(xJ)D~F(x,j) 
The question will rise, of course, as to which fields are to be considered 
as essential. The answer is, that this will largely depend on the current social 
conventions. However, it seems to be plausible to admit, under present con-
ditions, that those fields may be considered as essential that correspond to 
the so-called human rights.2 If that be accepted, we can say that a free socie-
ty is one in which all members are free in all fields corresponding to the so-
called human rights, and where there is at least one field on which none of 
them is free. 
Fourth step. However, even our (5) meets with a difficulty. Even in a 
most free society there are namely at least two classes of members who are 
not free—that of convicts in prisons and that of persons assigned to 
psychiatric hospitals. The idea that everybody should be free with exception 
of these two classes is, e.g., nicely expressed by the 16th century Polish law 
principle: "neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum"—"we shall imprison 
nobody unless he is convicted by law." An exception must be made, 
therefore, for the members of these two classes. Let us call the elements of 
their sum "Legal exceptions." We can say, then, that a free society is one in 
which all members, if they are not legal exceptions, are free in all essential 
fields and there is at least one field in which none of them is free. If we 
denote the said sum by "c" we may write: 
(6) FS(y) = :(x,j):M(x,y)- ~xec-jewI>-F(xJ):(3j)(x)-M(x,j)^ 
^ ~F(x,j). 
This is not a simple implication, but an equivalence, namely a defini-
tion stating the necessary and sufficient condition of a free society. 
5. The degrees of freedom 
It seems often to be assumed that the degree of freedom is identical in 
all free societies. In order to qualify as free, according to our (5), a society 
must grant to all its members (with the said exceptions) freedom in all essen-
tial fields. And yet it is possible to admit differences and therefore also 
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degrees in freedom of different societies. This can happen in three ways. (1) 
First, the interpretation of human rights and, consequently, of the essential 
fields may be different in different socities. It may happen therefore, that a 
field is considered as essential in one country and non-essential in another; 
then the citizen of the first will be free in the former but not in the latter.(2) 
Second, the rules determining who can be assigned to an asylum, and when, 
may differ from one society to another. Then the number of such in-
dividuals will differ. It is said, for example, that in the Soviet Union a 
citizen convicted of having "wrong" ideas may be sent to a psychiatric in-
stitute, which is not the case in, say, Switzerland.(3) Finally there can be dif-
ferences in respect of non-essential fields. In this case, in spite of the equali-
ty of the degree of freedom in regard to the essentials, there may be wide 
differences in other respects, resulting in the feeling that a society which 
limits too many non-essential freedoms is less free than one which does not 
act so. We may, therefore, conclude that there may different degrees of 
freedom in free societies. 
Such degrees cannot be analyzed with the conventional "absolute" 
quantifiers "all" and "there is"; we need here numerical qualtifiers of the 
type of "there are M/n of the x's so that . . . " The question arises, of 
course, if such a quantification is possible. The answer is, that there should 
be no difficulty in so far as the individuals (citizens) are concerned, because 
they can be, on principle, counted. The quantification of the fields offers, it 
is true, a difficulty, far different fields (even essential fields) having dif-
ferent "weights" as those are considered as being of different impor-
tance—and thus, so it seems, cannot be simply counted. This difficulty 
could perhaps be avoided by the introduction of a numerical weight-factor. 
It may also be remarked that the quantification needed here does not re-
quire that a numerical value be ascribed to each field or group of fields—it 
is enough that they might be linearly arranged. 
If this could be done, then the whole field of possible degrees of 
freedom would be represented by the space between cartesian coor-
dinates—the fields being written on the ordinate (O-A in our diagram) and 
the individuals on the abscissa (O-D). 
The proposed diagram will look as follows: 
214 J. M. BOCHENSKI 
M 
0) 
1/4 M ' 
M 
2 
M 
4 
r» 
t 
A 
* D 
i C 
z 
D 
(x,j) 
(x,j)~ 4 
M 
2 
3/4 M M 
This diagram helps visualize the difficulty in estimating which one of 
the two societies is more free than the other. Is that e.g., the case of the 
society represented by the point B(three quarters of the fields, but only one 
quarter of the citizens)—or by that represented by the point C (inverse situa-
tion)? 
University of Fribourg 
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J. M. Bochenski 
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NOTES 
1. A theory of authority has been developed by the author in Was ist Autoritat? 
(Freiburg i.B. 1974.) 
2. This idea is due to Professors M. Jensen and W. Mecking (unpublished paper, 
read at Key Biscayne, Florida, on March 30, 1985). 
